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Abstract 
Kant’s conception of remorse has not received focused discussion in the literature.  I 
argue that he thinks we ought to experience remorse for both retributivist and consequentialist 
reasons.  This account casts helpful light on his ideas of conversion and the descent into the hell 
of self-cognition.  But while he prescribes a heartbreakingly painful experience of remorse, he 
acknowledges that excess remorse can threaten rational agency through distraction and suicide, 
and this raises questions about whether actual human beings ought to cultivate their consciences 
in such a way as to experience remorse on his model.   
 
I. Introduction 
We can respond emotionally to the belief that we have acted immorally with a variety of 
painful feelings, some of which include disgust, embarrassment, shame, remorse, and guilt.  
Remorse differs from the feelings listed before remorse on the list just given, in that we can 
understand (even if we do not endorse) the earlier-listed feelings as responses to anything that 
can prompt mockery from others, even if it is clearly not a moral failing (for example, vomiting 
at the podium during a talk as a result of food poisoning).  The difference between remorse and 
guilt is more complex—terminologically “guilt” is used both to refer to a painful moral feeling 
and also to a state of culpability which can be determined by a court, or God, or conscience, 
 
1 I reiterate some aspects of the interpretation I attribute to Kant here in another paper I have 
under review.  There it is for the purpose of contrasting Kant’s own account of remorse with an 




which we think ought to have a painful feeling as a feature, but has other features too (for 
example, courts can "find" people guilty even if they do not feel guilty).  Here I will focus 
primarily upon remorse. 
Kant comments on all the feelings in the list given above in various passages.  Disgust 
[Ekel] can “make moral aversion sensible” 2 (MM 6:406), and some specific vices (such as 
 
2 Abbreviations and translations for Kant’s texts are from the following books unless otherwise 
noted. “t” in passages from Kant indicates that I have altered the Cambridge translation to reflect 
my own translation.  Pagination is by Akademie edition, which is included in texts cited, unless 
otherwise noted. "NA" at the end of entries in the following list in this note indicates texts not 
included in the Akademie edition; quotes from these are paginated according to the volume cited. 
Translations from German-language volumes in this list are my own. A/B: Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998.  2C: Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 
137-271. Cambridge University Press, 1996. AP: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 
trans. Robert B. Louden.  In Anthropology, History and Education, ed. Günther Zöller and 
Robert B. Louden, 231-429.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. CA: Collins notes 
from Kant’s Anthropology lectures in Lectures on Anthropology, trans. Robert B. Clewis, Robert 
B. Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, and Allen W. Wood.  Ed. Allen W. Wood and Robert B. 
Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 11-26. CO: Immanuel Kant: 
Correspondence, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
CE: Collins notes from Kant’s Ethics lectures, in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, ed. 
Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 37-222. CF: 
The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Religion and Rational 
Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, 237-327. FA: Notes from Kant’s Anthropology lectures by Michael 
Friedländer, in Lectures on Anthropology (ibid.), 37-255.  G: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, in Practical Philosophy (ibid.), 41-108. HM: Notes from Kant's Metaphysics lectures by 
J.G. Herder, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften: Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und 
Rationaltheologie (Band 28, Erste Hälfte), ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1968.  MA: Notes from Kant’s Anthropology lectures by Christian Coelestin Mrongovius, in 
Lectures on Anthropology (ibid.), 335-509. MM: The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical 
Philosophy (ibid.), 363-602. MT: On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy, 
trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology (ibid.), 19-38.  RR: Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational 
Theology, (ibid.), 39-216. RS: Review of Schulz's Attempt at an Introduction to a Doctrine of 
Morals for All Human Beings Regardless of Different Religions, in Practical Philosophy (ibid.), 
1-10. S1: Notes from Kant's Anthropology lectures likely from 1780-1 (date uncertain), in 
Immanuel Kant’s Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie, ed. Fr. Ch. Starke, 
Leipzig: Die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831NA. S2: Notes from Kant's 
Anthropology lectures in the winter term of 1790-1791, in Immanuel Kant's Anweisung zur 
3 
 
lechery) typically prompt disgust (MA 25:1349), but disgust does not appear to play a significant 
role in Kant’s account of self-reactive moral feeling.3  He emphasizes that there are things which 
prompt disgust in some people but joy in others (OB 2:207), such as strong smells (MA 25:1246) 
and French cuisine (MA 25:1402), with the implication that while these things seem disgusting 
to him, there need be no moral defect in those who feel otherwise.  Kant thinks of embarrassment 
[Verlegenheit] as resulting from attention from others which prompts attention to oneself and 
leads to self-consciousness (AP 7:121, 132), and while this can happen when we act unethically, 
it can also reflect laudable motivations.  He gives an example of embarrassment from being 
caught in a lie (FA 25:633), but also says that someone seriously [ernstlich] in love may be 
embarrassed in the presence of the beloved, while a deceiving seducer will not be embarrassed in 
the presence of his target.4  Shame [Scham] is perhaps more like a moral feeling than the 
previous ones, but while it can  express injury to one’s sense of moral dignity (2C 5:88), it can 
also express injury to one’s sense of honor in a way that is not bound up with moral dignity but 
has merely to do with the opinions of others, whether they be right or wrong (OB 2:218).5  Kant 
notes that shame can be prompted by forgetfulness (MA 25:1241) and talking to oneself (RR 
6:195n).   
Kant’s comments on remorse and guilt indicate that they are always bound up with the 
belief that one has acted immorally, but here analysis of his terminology is more complex.  The 
German word Kant uses which translates as “guilt” is "Schuld", which can also mean debt or 
 
Menschen - und Weltkenntniß. Nach dessen Vorlesungen im Winterhalbjahre von 1790/91, ed. 
Fr. Ch. Starke, Leipzig: Die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831NA. VE: Notes from 
Kant’s Ethics lectures by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius in Lectures on Ethics, (ibid.), 249-452.  
3 See Clewis (2009: 114-16) for a discussion of disgust in the context of Kant’s aesthetics. 
4 See Cohen (2009: 44-5) for a discussion of how embarrassment thwarts anthropological 
observation. 
5 See Sussman (2008) for a discussion of Kant’s account of shame. 
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obligation, and he often uses it in the context of legal or divine judgment.  Kant uses Schuld 
rarely in ways that indicate that he is thinking of feeling, but he does write of feeling guilty in at 
least one place (schuldig zu fühlen, RR 6:38).  The English word “remorse” has a helpful 
simplicity in that it refers just to painful moral feeling, but matching it up to Kant’s German is 
complicated.  Kant uses a number of terms which the Cambridge edition translates as “remorse”, 
including Zerknirschung, Kummers, Verweis, and Reue.  All of these words can be translated in 
other ways.  Kant uses Zerknirschung (also "contrition”) and Kummers (also "sorrow") rarely.  
Kant uses "Verweis" in several places, but it is more literally "rebuke" or "reprimand".  Kant uses 
"Reue" at least 40 times, and the related verb "bereuen" at least 10, so this term plays a more 
significant role, but it has a meaning which is broader than "remorse".  Helpfully, Kant draws 
distinctions which mark out a kind of Reue which I take to be identical to remorse, which he 
calls "moralische [moral] Reue" (CE 27:353) and "wahre [true] Reue" (VE 27:464).  "Reue" has 
"rue" as a close cognate in English, and both can mean painful regret for our past actions either 
because they were immoral, or because they were imprudent and brought negative consequences 
upon us, and only the former meaning matches "remorse".  Kant discusses this distinction in 
multiple places.  In the Collins Ethics lecture notes, Kant identifies "moralische Reue" as Reue 
for behavior "in regard to morality "[in Ansehung der Moralität]" and distinguishes it from Reue 
because one has acted "imprudently [unklug]" (CE 27:353).  Similarly, in his famous 1792 letter 
to Maria von Herbert (CO 11:333, discussed below), he distinguishes Reue over "imprudence 
[Unklugheit]" from Reue "grounded in a purely moral judgment [auf bloßer sittlicher 
Beurtheilung ...Verhaltens gründet]" about one's behavior.   
The Cambridge edition often translates "Reue" as "repentance", which suggests a 
theological orientation, and this context is often part of Kant's discussions, but I do not wish my 
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account here to be relevant only for this context.  However, I take Kant's to hold that the 
emotional core of sincere repentance even in a theological context is remorse, and that this core 
can be isolated from the feelings specifically about God which are also involved in repentance, 
for example, fear of God’s punishment.  Kant distinguishes the "inner sorrow" of "wahre [true] 
Reue" (CE 27:464) from the sorrow of Buße, which the Cambridge edition also translates as 
"repentance", but can also be rendered as "penance".  Kant remarks that "Buße" is "not a good 
not a good term; it derives from penances and chastisements [Büßungen, Kasteyungen]" which 
we inflict on ourselves when we recognize that we deserve punishment, in the hope that God will 
not punish us later (CE 27:464).  At MM 6:485, Kant draws a parallel distinction between 
moralische zu bereuen and büßen:  
monkish ascetics, which from superstitious fear or hypocritical loathing of oneself 
goes to work with self-torture (Selbstpeinigung) and mortification of the flesh, is 
not directed to virtue but rather to fantastically purging oneself of sin by imposing 
punishments (Strafe) on oneself. Instead of morally repenting [moralisch zu 
bereuen] sins (with a view to improving), it wants to do penance [büßen][.] 
 
I think these distinctions allow us to equate remorse with Kant's wahre, moralische Reue (though 
I think the Cambridge translation is helpful in rendering the broader range of expressions noted 
above as remorse as well).  Therefore, in the following I will typically replace appearances of 
"repentance" and its derivatives in the Cambridge translation with "remorset" or derivatives in 
cases where it seems clear that Kant is referring to wahre, moralische Reue. 
In this paper I will address the following questions.  What are the reasons Kant gives us 
for feeling remorse?  How does Kant think we should cultivate the experience of remorse on the 
basis of those reasons?  And last, but not least: is the experience of remorse Kant thinks we 
should cultivate an appropriate one to recommend for flawed agents like ourselves?  I do not 
mean to suggest that we typically experience remorse as a result of explicit deliberation about 
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reasons for remorse.  Kant holds that we have an “instinct” to judge our evil actions in a way that 
“conveys to us an inner pain” (CE 27:296-7), and this suggests the plausible view that the 
experience of remorse has an immediacy which makes it prior to such deliberation.  On the other 
hand, remorse is prompted by conscience, and we have a duty to cultivate conscience (MM 
6:401), and this duty entails an ability to rationally shape conscience.  We must make judgments 
about which actions we cause ourselves inner pain over, to avoid a "micrological" conscience 
"burdened with many small scruples on matters of indifference", and a "morbid conscience", 
which "seeks to impute evil in [one's] actions, when there is really no ground for it" (CE 27:356). 
We must "sharpen" conscience it if it is too dull (MM 6:401), but we must not make it too sharp. 
To brood over remorse [über Reue zu brüten] can "make one's whole life useless by continuous 
self-reproach [Vorwürfe]" (CO 11:333), and an "excess of remorse [Kummers] over 
…transgressions of duty" can prompt suicide (VE 27:642).  Shaping conscience in these ways 
requires judgments about when and how we should feel remorse, and such judgments must be 
grounded in reasons for remorse.       
 
II. Kant's Account of Reasons for Remorse 
There are at least three plausible ways of justifying the pain of remorse.  One is 
retributive: we should have painful feelings in response to past wrongful actions because we 
deserve them, whether or not they lead to good consequences.  Retributivist justifications are 
often called "backward-looking" because they refer only to past wrongs.  Pure retributivism 
would be the view that only retributive considerations play a role in justifying remorse.  A 
second is consequentialist: we should feel remorse because it motivates us to act more morally in 
the future.  Consequentialist justifications are thus often called "forward-looking".  Pure 
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consequentialism would be the view that only consequentialist considerations play a role in 
justifying remorse.  Third, a hybrid justification of remorse includes multiple justifying reasons.  
I will argue that if we exercise interpretative care in assembling the sometimes-contradictory 
remarks in Kant’s texts, we have a good case for attributing a hybrid justification to Kant, which 
has a retributive basis, but is consequentially constrained. 
Kant's account of reasons for remorse has not received focused discussion in the 
literature, but it has been discussed indirectly in relation to Kant's account of conscience, by way 
of a debate between Thomas Hill and Allen Wood about whether conscience punishes.  A 
resolution of this debate cannot on its own answer the question about Kant’s reasons for remorse, 
since Kant’s reasons for punishment are themselves matters of controversy.  However, a review 
of the debate will situate the present inquiry in the literature and provide helpful context. 
On Thomas Hill's interpretation, a "bad conscience 'hurts', and…Kant treats this pain as 
analogous to the suffering imposed on lawbreakers by the system of criminal justice" (2002: 
352).  He points out that Kant sees conscience as an inner court in which we "think of ourselves 
as playing several roles: that of accuser, defender, and finally a judge", who 
issues verdicts of acquittal or condemnation.  Like a trial judge, who is not 
legislating or merely informing others about the law, conscience ‘imputes’, 
‘reproaches’, and passes ‘sentence’.  If it judges us to be guilty, we are made to 
suffer, and at times the result can be torment. (2002: 301) 
 
Hill reads Kant as holding that conscience "enforces the law, passes sentence", and "makes us 
suffer for our misdeeds" (2002: 353). 
 By contrast, Allen Wood holds that conscience does not punish (2008: 187).  He claims 
that "Kant denies that it is even possible to punish oneself", citing MM 6:335, which is a 
discussion of social contract theory and the justification of external punishment according to 
principles of right.  There Kant states that "it is impossible to will to be punished", but just as 
8 
 
clearly states that there is indeed a sense in which "I draw up a penal law against myself as a 
criminal": "pure reason in me (homo noumenon)…subjects me, as someone capable of crime and 
so as another person [my boldface]" to punishment (MM 6:335).   
Kant also addresses concern about self-punishment at MM 6:485 (quoted above), where 
he faults "monkish ascetics" for aiming at penance (büßen) rather than the experience of remorse 
(moralisch zu bereuen), in part because it involves "punishment [Strafe] chosen and executed by 
oneselft", while punishment "must always be imposed by another".  But as  Hill emphasizes in 
his remarks quoted just above, Kant  holds that agents must take on multiple perspectives in the 
experience of conscience, just as we saw they must do in drawing up penal law against 
themselves.6  Kant discusses this in detail at MM 6:438: 
conscience is peculiar in that, although its business is a business of a human being 
with himself, one constrained by his reason sees himself constrained to carry it on 
as at the bidding of another person…[T]o think of a human being who is accused 
by his conscience as one and the same person as the judge is an absurd way of 
representing a court, since then the prosecutor would always lose…[A] human 
being's conscience will, accordingly, have to think of someone other than himself 
…as the judge of his actions...This other may be an actual person or a merely 
ideal person that reason creates for itself.   
 
If punishment must be inflicted by another person, and conscience contains a judge who 
we must represent as a different person even though he is really an aspect of ourselves, then we 
represent the pain of conscience as punishment inflicted by another person even though it is 
inflicted by an aspect of ourselves.  I think this is Kant's view.  I think his criticism of monkish 
ascetics is not that it involves self-punishment as such, but rather that it involves self-punishment 
which is not mediated by the inner judge of conscience—that it is about doing penance by 
imposing unpleasant experiences "such as a fast" on oneself instead of experiencing wahre, 
 
6 See Timmermann (2014) for a helpful discussion of the perspectival structure of Kant’s ethics. 
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moralische Reue, and is thus a self-deluding substitute for the kind of self-punishment inflicted 
by one's inner judge.   
Perhaps the most definitive passage supporting the view that conscience punishes is one 
that neither Hill nor Wood cite in their texts quoted here, at MT 8:260:  
[T]he virtuous man lends to the depraved the characteristic of his own 
constitution, namely, a conscientiousness [Gewissenhaftigkeit] in all its severity 
which, the more virtuous a human being is, all the more harshly punishes 
[bestraft] him because of the slightest indiscretion frowned upon by the moral law 
in him. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the virtuous have consciences which function properly, so if their 
consciences punish, then it is the proper function of conscience to punish. 
Wood acknowledges that on Kant's view, "conscience can 'judge us punishable'", but he 
claims that Kant thinks conscience does not inflict punishment upon us itself, and that "our 
happiness or misery is left for the ruler of the world to decide", citing MS 6:439n, 440, and 460 
in support.  But the purpose of Kant's discussion of God at MS 6:439n and 440 is to explain that 
we must think of the "internal judge" who "pronounces the sentence of happiness or misery" 
(MM 6:439n) as God, while emphasizing that this idea is given to us "subjectively, by practical 
reason" (MM 6:439) and is merely another perspective on "morally lawgiving reason…present in 
our inmost being" (MM 6:440).  This makes it clear that anything we must think of God as doing 
to us in the context of conscience also must be understood as something we do to ourselves.  MM 
6:460-1 is a dramatic passage in which Kant talks about the limits of vengeance: 
Every deed that violates a human being's right deserves [verdient] punishment, 
the function of which is to avenge [geracht] a crime on the one who committed it 
(not merely to make good the harm that was done). But punishment is not an act 
that the injured party can undertake on his private authority but rather an act of a 
court distinct from him, which gives effect to the law of a supreme authority over 
all those subject to it…no one is authorized to inflict punishment and to avenge 
…except him who is also the supreme moral lawgiver; and he alone (namely 
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God) can say "Vengeance [Rache] is mine; I will repay."  It is, therefore, a duty of 
virtue…to refrain from repaying another's enmity…out of mere revenge [.]  
 
The kind of punishment at issue here is external punishment we inflict on bodily distinct others, 
which Kant says cannot be done out of vengeance, because only God can punish out of 
vengeance.  Implicit but obviously present here is the assumption that we must not think of 
ourselves as like God when we punish others.  If we follow Wood in applying this passage to 
conscience, it would seem to imply that, since we must think of the inner judge as God, and we 
can think of God as punishing out of vengeance, and this inner judge is an aspect of ourselves, 
we can think of ourselves as inflicting self-punishment out of vengeance.  If we bracket the 
troubling concept of vengeance, then the conclusion this line of thought suggests is that we can 
think of the pain of remorse as self-retribution, since what is at issue is deserved (verdient) 
punishment. 
However, since Kant does not refer to conscience at MM 6:460, more direct evidence that 
conscience is retributive would be helpful.  Kant offers more direct evidence in his discussion of 
the negative duty to promote others' "moral well-being": 
[T]he pain one feels from the pangs of conscience [Gewissensbissen] has a moral 
source…To see to it that another does not deservedly [verdienterweise] suffer this 
inner reproach [innere Vorwurf] is not my duty but his affair; but it is my duty to 
refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could 
tempt him. to do something for which his conscience could afterwards torturet 
[peinigen] him [.] (MM 6:394) 
 
This remark seems to imply quite straightforwardly that to experience pain from the pangs of 
conscience—to suffer remorse—is to deservedly suffer inner reproach.   
 However, Kant also many remarks implying that consequentialist (forward-looking) 
considerations play a role in justifying remorse.  In the "monkish ascetics" passage discussed 
earlier, he states that moralische zu bereuen requires a "view to improving" (MM 6:485).  In the 
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Religion he criticizes "remorseful self-inflicted torments [reuige Selbstpeinigungen] that do 
not…originate in any genuine disposition toward improvement" (RR 6:77).  In the Anthropology 
he warns against regarding our "record of guilt as…simply wiped out (through remorset [Reue]), 
so that [we are] spared the effort toward improvement" (AP 7:236).  
In fact, in some passages, Kant suggests such a complete reliance on consequentialist 
considerations in justifying remorse that he seems to advocate a pure consequentialism, such that 
the only reason to feel remorse is because of its consequences.  In the Mrongovius Anthropology 
lecture notes (1784-5), Kant criticizes "idle desires" connected with the "wish that something 
would not have happened which, however, now is impossible" as a "distraction" which is 
"senseless and harmful".  He gives  "remorse [Reue]" as an example of such desires, and says 
that it "is good merely insofar as it impels us to cancel the consequences thereof and to act 
better in the sequel" (MA 25:1335, my boldface).  His point seems to be that when we feel 
remorse, we should try to eliminate painful thoughts connected with the wish that we had not 
acted badly and focus on acting better.  But retributive (backward-looking) justifications of 
remorse would seem to be intrinsically bound up with the thought that past bad actions ought not 
to have happened, and so the MA 25:1335 remarks suggest that there is no role for retributivism 
here.  The Starke 2 Anthropology lecture notes (1790-1791) express what I take to be a similar 
thought: "fruitless remorse [Reue] is useless, because it attacks our powers too much"(S2 34).  
Perhaps the strongest suggestion of a pure consequentialism about remorse comes in a pair of 
passages in the Starke 1 (also known as "Menschenkunde") Anthropology lecture notes (likely 
1780-1): 
Remorse [Reue] for crimes committed, as soon as it is not connected with the 
endeavor to make amends for the crime, is an empty delusion; for with it no other 
man is served that one plagues oneself with a torment, so one must also make an 




Remorse [Reue] alone, as such, has no value, except insofar as it is the motive 
force of improvement. Remorse is serious [ernstlich] when it passes over as 
quickly as possible to good deeds. He who believes that remorse has a value in 
itself is very much mistaken. (S1 269) 
 
If remorse is a delusion with no value in itself independent of the motivation to produce the good 
consequences of motivating us to improve or make amends, then retributivism plays no role in 
justifying remorse.  If we attribute this view to Kant, then we have a clear conflict with the view 
suggested at MM 6:394 and 6:460 (quoted above).   
There are, however, remarks in which Kant indicates that there are multiple reasons for 
remorse, and this would imply a hybrid theory.  In Kant's critique of Johann Schulz's moral 
theory, Kant attributes a number of theses to Schulz with the clear implication that Kant does not 
accept them.  One of these theses is that "Remorse [Reue] is merely a misunderstood 
representation of how one could act better in the future, and in fact nature has no other purpose 
in it than the end of improvement" (RS 8:110).  If Kant rejects this, he thinks that remorse has 
another purpose distinct from improvement, and it is reasonable to assume that this is retribution, 
in light of the foregoing.  Support for this view is also offered by Herder's Metaphysics notes, 
which attribute to Kant the statement that "[i]f remorse [Reue] about the past prevents all 
attention to the future, it is absurd" (HM 28:90).  This suggests that it is appropriate for remorse 
to be both forward-looking but also backward-looking to some degree.  A final and I think 
definitive text supporting a hybrid justification appears in the Collins Ethics lecture notes.  There 
Kant writes that preachers attending the dying "must…see to it, that people do indeed feel 
remorse t for [bereuen] the transgression of self-regarding duties, since these can no longer be 
remedied, but that if they have wronged another, they genuinely try to make amends" (CE 
27:354).  Kant here gives us a case where he thinks the imminence of death means that there is a 
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forward-looking way to respond to some but not all of one's past bad actions.  He states clearly 
that we should feel remorse for the actions to which we cannot respond in a forward-looking 
way, and based on MM 6:394 and 6:460 it is fair to assume that we should feel such remorse 
because we deserve it.  His point about the actions to which we can respond in a forward-looking 
way seems to be that we should feel remorse about them but apply it to the production of good 
consequences. 
Though there are tensions among the passages we have considered, I think together they 
give us sufficient evidence to attribute the following view to Kant.  We must retributively inflict 
remorse on ourselves for past wrongs.  But this self-retribution is consequentially constrained in 
two ways.  First, remorse should improve our behavior: it should lead us to act better in general 
(which we have seen at RR 6:77, MM 6:485, RS 8:110, and S1 93 and 269), and it should 
prompt us to make amends to the particular people we have wronged (which we have seen at CE 
27:354, and S1 93).  Second, remorse must be moderated insofar as moderation is required to 
avoid damage to our rational agency. We saw this near the outset in Kant's  warnings against 
brooding over remorse in a way that makes our lives "useless" (CO 11:333), and against being 
driven to suicide by excess remorse (VE 27:642), and more recently in his admonitions against 
remorse's "distraction" (MA 25:1335) and "attacks [on] our powers" (S2 34).   
This gives us an outline of Kant’s view of remorse, but it leaves some important 
questions unanswered.  How much remorse does Kant think we should feel, and for how long? 
And does he have an account of how we channel it into self-improvement?  Kant engages these 
questions most directly in his discussions of the “descent into the hell of self-cognition”, which 




III. The Descent into the Hell of Self-Cognition  
Kant says he borrows the phrase Höllenfahrt des Selbsterkenntnisses from his 
acquaintance Johann Hamann (CF 7:55).7  A version of this phrase appears in the Collins 
Anthropology notes (dated to 1772-3), where Kant says that one of the reasons the science of 
anthropology is neglected, despite being very interesting, is that “one conjectures he would not 
find much to rejoice at if he were to undertake the difficult descent into Hell toward the 
knowledge of himself [die schwierige Höllenfahrt zur Erkentniß seiner selbst] (CA 25:7).  Kant 
uses it again in a famous passage in the Doctrine of Virtue: 
For…a human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a 
being's will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an 
evil will actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to 
a good will within him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of 
self-cognition [Höllenfahrt des Selbsterkenntnisses] can pave the way to 
godliness.)  (MM 6:441) 
 
Following a number of commentators8, I think Kant’s reference to removing an evil will, and 
developing the predisposition to good means that we should link this passage to the conversion 
in the Religion (RR 6:73), which Kant also calls a “justification [Rechtfertigung] of a human 
being who is indeed guilty but has passed into a disposition wellpleasing to God” (MM 6:76).  
Kant does not explicitly discuss remorse in the interpretatively challenging discussion of the 
conversion in the Religion, but I will argue we can connect that discussion to a crucial discussion 
of the Höllenfahrt in Conflict of the Faculties (CF 7:10, 7:54-9) in a way that sheds light on both 
these texts and on Kant’s theory of remorse.   
In Kant’s view, we all begin our lives as radically evil, which means that we are willing 
to comply with the moral law only insofar as we are also able to satisfy the incentives of self 
 
7 See Kuehn (2001: 118-135) for an account of their relationship. 
8 E.g. Muchnik (2014: 240), Sweet (2013: 99), Ware (2009: 684-90). 
15 
 
love (RR 6:36).  This is a way of incorporating evil into our maxims.  Kant claims that since this 
evil is in our “maxims in general (in the manner of universal principles as contrasted with 
individual transgressions)”, it entails “an infinity of violations of the law” and thus an “infinity of 
guilt [Schuld]” for which we must expect “infinite punishment [Strafe] and exclusion from the 
Kingdom of God.” (RR 6:72).9  He holds that elimination of radical evil requires us to undergo a 
conversion in which we transform our disposition so that we choose to satisfy self-love only on 
the condition that we do our duty.  But he thinks that mere fact of becoming a better person 
through conversion does not negate our desert of punishment (RR 6:72).  Instead, he thinks 
conversion introduces a puzzle about when we can appropriately be punished.  He thinks that it 
should not be thought of as “fully exacted before” the conversion (RR 6:73).  On the other hand, 
“after his conversion…the punishment cannot be considered appropriate to his new quality (of 
thus being a human being well-pleasing to God)” (RR 6:73).  Kant’s proposed solution is as 
follows: 
[S]ince neither before nor after conversion is the punishment in accordance with 
divine wisdom but is nevertheless necessary, the punishment must be thought as 
adequately executed in the situation of conversion itself…Now conversion is an 
exit from evil and an entry into goodness, “the putting off of the old man and the 
putting on of the new”, since the subject dies unto sin (and thereby also the 
subject of all inclinations that lead to sin) in order to live unto justice. As an 
intellectual determination, however, this conversion is not two moral acts 
separated by a temporal interval but is rather a single act, since the abandonment 
of evil is possible only through the good disposition that effects the entrance into 
goodness, and vice- versa. The good principle is present, therefore, just as much 
in the abandonment of the evil as in the adoption of the good disposition, and the 
pain that by rights accompanies the first derives entirely from the second. The 
emergence from the corrupted disposition into the good is in itself already 
sacrifice (as “the death of the old man,” “the crucifying of the flesh”) and 
entrance into a long train of life’s ills which the new human being undertakes in 
the disposition of the Son of God[.] (RR 6:73-4) 
 
9 Kant’s view that everyone deserves infinite punishment may imply the view that people who 
commit horrible crimes deserve no more punishment than people who do not, and this on its own 




While it is important to emphasize that Kant maintains a significant skepticism about using the 
historical story of Christ as an epistemological foundation in theology throughout his corpus, and 
seems to rely on it only as metaphor, it is clear that Kant is telling us that the conversion involves 
a pain that is appropriately understood as understood as excruciating, though it is unclear 
whether Kant intends it to be understood as infinite in degree in any sense (or whether Kant’s 
account of the intensive magnitude of sensation would permit a sensation infinite in degree).10 
This passage is not clear about how long the pain Kant prescribes should endure, but 
Kant goes on to describe the “the suffering which the new human being must endure while dying 
to the old human being” as occurring “throughout his life” (RR 6:74), and this makes it clear that 
at least some aspect of the pain of the conversion is experienced as long as we live.  Further, 
given that Kant appeals to the claim that we can only make “endless progress” toward complete 
conformity with the moral law in his argument for immortality as a postulate of pure practical 
reason (2C 5:122), we might suppose that some aspect of this suffering must occur forever, even 
beyond earthly life, and must thus be infinite in duration.  
However, I think it is important to attend to the distinction Kant draws toward the end of 
the passage above between the sacrifice “already involved in the emergence from the corrupt 
disposition” and the “long train of life’s ills” to which this “emergence” is an “entrance”.  I think 
this implies that Kant is prescribing some kind of initial painful experience of finite duration 
followed by a second stage that involves “life’s ills”, which in connection with the remark about 
suffering throughout life (RR 6:74, cited above) can be understood to continue at least as long as 
 
10 At A176/B217, Kant says that the intensive magnitude of a sensation “can be raised from 0 up 




one’s earthly life continues.11  To defend the claim that there is such a distinction, it would be 
helpful to have a clearer account of what kinds of pain are at issue.   
In light of the discussions earlier in this paper, it seems natural to think that remorse for 
our past evils would fit somewhere into the pain of conversion, but as noted earlier, Kant does 
not explicitly address the pain of remorse in this discussion of the conversion.  Instead, his focus 
is on pain that results from resistance to the inclinations which “lead to sin”, a resistance which 
we must demand of ourselves in a new way after the conversion.  That is, while our inclinations 
persist after the conversion, we have rejected the evil maxim of conditioning compliance with 
law on satisfaction of our inclinations, and have adopted a new maxim of conditioning 
satisfaction of inclinations on compliance with law, and resisting inclinations can be painful.  
Since having inclinations which do not necessarily conform to law is simply part of what it is to 
be a sensibly conditioned rational agent, we must assume that our inclinations will persist as long 
as we are such agents, and so it makes sense to think that the pain deriving from their resistance 
would continue as long as we continue as such agents.  This kind of pain is thus a good candidate 
for what I claim is a second stage of conversion pain. 
 However, Kant’s focus on the pain of resisting inclination creates an interpretative 
conundrum.  Kant thinks that to understand the infinite punishment we must receive for past 
evils as “adequately executed in the situation of conversion itself” (RR 6:73, quoted above), we 
must see “all the sufferings and ills of life in general” as punishment for our past evils.  But the 
pain of resisting inclinations is a puzzling thing to regard as punishment for past evils, for three 
 
11 While practical reason requires us to see the phenomenology of conversion as the 
manifestation of noumenally timeless action, transcendental idealism implies that this need not 
be in tension with the claim that the phenomenology of conversion is a process with a 
determinate temporal structure.  (See Loncar (2013: 360) for an argument which disputes the 
notion that conversion has “empirical manifestations” with a real temporal ‘before and after’”.) 
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reasons.  First, since having inclinations which do not necessarily conform to law is simply part 
of being a sensibly conditioned rational agent, dealing with the pain of resisting inclination is 
presumably part of the daily affairs of such agents.  How can an ordinary kind of unpleasantness 
required to maintain rational agency be regarded as punishment?  Second, it is pain we must 
grapple with in order to do the right thing in the present, so it seems to lack the backward-
looking reference which seems essential to regarding pain as justified based on past evils.  The 
third reason takes longer to explain but is the most important. Consider some features of Kant’s 
view of the ontological and moral status of inclinations.  The “natural inclinations do not have us 
for their author”—they are “conatural to us” and we “cannot presume ourselves responsible for 
them” (RR 6:35).  They themselves are “innocent” and bear “no direct relation to evil” (RR 
6:35).  They only lead to sin if we adopt a fundamental maxim of conditioning our compliance 
with law on satisfaction of our inclinations, and that fundamental maxim does not have a 
“ground…in the natural inclinations” (RR 6:34).  The “inclinations only make more difficult the 
execution of the good maxims opposing them” (RR 6:57n).  Now suppose that sensibly 
conditioned rational agent 1 begins life in the right way, by prioritizing duty over inclination, 
and thus does not deserve to suffer, while sensibly conditioned agent 2 begins life in the wrong 
way, by inverting that priority, and thus does deserve to suffer.  Kant’s view of the ontological 
and moral status of inclinations would seem to imply that both 1 and 2 would have to contend 
with the pain of resisting inclinations.  If God or Reason say that it is just for 2 to have this pain 
because of his past evils, then 1 can quite reasonably object that it is unjust for him to have this 
pain too.  We might suppose that there is an implicit background metaphysics which respects the 
deserts of 1-type agents by ensuring that they are never incarnated as sensibly conditioned 
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agents, but that would seem to imply that we are in some sense responsible for being assailed by 
inclinations, and (as noted) Kant appears to reject this.   
Kant’s idea that the pain of conversion is justified by our past evils would thus make 
more sense if he had a more plausible locus of punitive pain.  I think what I claimed above to be 
the first stage of conversion pain can provide such a locus if the pain in that stage is remorse.  I 
think that strong evidence to support this idea appears in Conflict of the Faculties, where Kant 
explicitly discusses the concepts of conversion, the Höllenfahrt, and remorse.  Care is required to 
put this discussion forward as evidence about Kant’s own view, because he offers it in the 
context of a critique of the Pietist conception of conversion.  In the Preface to this work, he says 
that Pietists hold that forgiveness requires “an overwhelming remorse [Zerknirschung]”, which 
he also calls “a deep remorseful sorrowt [ein tiefer reuiger Gram]” (CF 7:10).  But he faults their 
view not because of the deep remorse it prescribes, but because they hold that the “human being” 
cannot “attain this by himself”, and so “the remorsefult (reuvolle) sinner must especially beg this 
remorse (Reue) from heaven” (ibid.).  He goes on to argue that it is “obvious that anyone who 
still has to beg for this remorset (Reue) (for his transgressions) does not really feel remorse fort 
(wirklich nicht reuet) his deeds” (ibid.).  So he is not denying the claim that we ought to feel 
deep remorseful sorrow—he is rather asserting (contra Pietism) that we can attain it on our own.  
Later, in the “General Remark: On Religious Sects” (CF 7:48-61), he explicitly states that this 
remorse is part of conversion.  At 7:54, he asks “how is rebirth (resulting from a conversion by 
which one becomes an other, new man) possible[?]”, and writes that  
According to the Pietist hypothesis, the operation that separates good from evil 
(of which human nature is compounded) is a supernatural one – a feeling of 
remorset [Zerknirschung] and crushing [Zermalmung] of the heart in repentance 
(Buße), a sorrow…bordering on despair which can, however, reach the necessary 
intensity only by the influence of a heavenly spirit. The human being must 
himself beg for this grief, while grieving over the fact that his sorrow is not great 
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enough (to drive the pain [Leidsein] completely from his heart). Now as the late 
Hamann says: “This descent into the hell of self-knowledge [Höllenfahrt des 
Selbsterkenntnisses] paves the way to deification.” In other words, when the fire 
of repentance [Buße] has reached its height, the amalgam of good and evil breaks 
up and the purer metal of the reborn gleams through the dross, which surrounds 
but does not contaminate it, ready for service pleasing to God in good 
conduct…But even in the highest flight of a mystically inclined imagination, one 
cannot exempt man from doing anything himself, without making him a mere 
machine[.] (CF 7:55-6) 
 
This passage adds important detail in four ways.  First, it appears to have the same basic 
structure as the critique of Pietism in the preface: it is obviously critical, but the target of 
criticism is not the view that we ought to experience such profound remorse, but is instead the 
view that we cannot attain it on our own.  Second, it provides support for the view that Kant 
himself endorses the view that we ought to experience such remorse, because he clearly indicates 
that such remorse is (or is part of) the Höllenfahrt des Selbsterkenntnisses, which is established 
as an element of Kant’s own moral psychology by the way he refers to it at MM 6:441 (cited 
above).  Third, I think that Kant’s reference to the kind of remorse which Pietists might acquire 
by begging God for it as Buße rather that Reue is in line with the distinction we observed earlier, 
such that Buße is not wahre, moralische Reue.  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, if we 
suppose that Kant’s own view is that we should experience remorse like this under our own 
power (presumably through the faculty of conscience), then we get a detailed phenomenological 
picture of how remorse is channeled into improvement: stripped of the metallurgical analogy, the 
idea is that we must force the pain of remorse to rise to a great intensity, which leads to a kind of 
heartbreak, and with it, a conversion, at which point the remorse abates and is driven 
“completely from [one’s] heart” (CF 7:55, cited above).  If we take remorse to be the first stage 
of the pain of conversion, then this account of how remorse should cease would explain why 
Kant would think of it as finite in duration.  And if remorse is self-retribution inflicted by a part 
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of ourselves which we must also represent as God, then it is comprehensible to regard it as 
punishment that we deserve for our past evils, which I argued above is not the case with respect 
to the pain of resisting inclinations. 
I want to be cautious about suggesting that Kant thinks there is a causal process here, 
such that remorse causes the conversion, since it is clear that Kant thinks of this phenomenology 
as the manifestation of noumenal freedom.  However, given that we have an empirical character 
which is governed by causal laws, along with our noumenal character which is not governed by 
causal laws (see e.g. A539/B567), we can entertain the possibility that there are empirical-
psychological laws according to which the phenomenal experience of remorse can cause our 
phenomenal experience of conversion without suggesting that the remorse and the conversion are 
not manifestations of noumenal freedom.  We must, however, assume that there is enough 
diversity in such laws, or the antecedent conditions determining their instantiation, to 
accommodate experiences of remorse which do not conform to the ideal Kant seems to prescribe 
here.  Such non-ideal experiences of remorse would appear to be common, and the next section 
discusses some of them.   
    
IV. The Hazard of Suicide 
The last question I wish to consider is whether Kant has an account of how we moderate 
remorse so that it does not prompt damage to our rational agency such as distraction and suicide.  
As far as I can discover, apart from the general idea that we can avoid affect through rational 
regulation of our feelings (e.g. MM 407-9), he does not.  This is not to suggest that this general 
idea is not significant.  It may be all Kant really needs to say for it to be true that he offers an 
account of how we can moderate remorse.  But if he thinks that we ought to punish ourselves 
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with remorse until we crush our hearts, then it is reasonable for us to want a better account of 
moderation before we decide to cultivate our consciences in such a way as to strive for this 
experience, because of the way profound sorrow commonly prompt distraction and sometimes 
suicide.  Even if it is reasonable to suppose that there are experiences of remorse fitting what 
seems to be Kant’s ideal, where intense remorse leads to a conversion, which in turn leads to a 
cessation of remorse, it is clear that not all remorse fits this model.  By Kant’s own admission, 
people do not always tidily resolve their remorse in this way, and this is by no means always 
because they continue to act wrongly.  Kant acknowledges this in his recognition of the problem 
of excess remorse, and more generally the problems of "micrological" and “morbid” conscience 
mentioned earlier (CE 27:356).  Certainly we can say that agents afflicted by these problems fail 
to regulate affect, but given how common such failure is, I do not think this is enough to say to 
defend the view that we ought to cultivate remorse on this model.   
Further, if one "connects the transgression or violation of his conscience with the idea of 
losing his entire moral worth" (VE 27:575), as Kant claims, there is arguably a kind of tragic 
rationality in thinking that blotting oneself out through suicide is appropriate self-retribution, 
even though this permanently forecloses the possibility of improvement.  It is presumably 
because of this tragic rationality that Kant makes the distressing comment that suicide from 
excess remorse is not a "crude" kind of suicide "which should be an object of general hatred", 
but is rather a suicide which "could betray a worth of the soul", like suicide for "the conservation 
of [one's] honour" (VE 27:642), despite the fact that he sees suicide as a grave violation of duty. 
We may even have an example of suicide motivated by excess remorse in Kant's own 
correspondent Maria von Herbert.  In a 1791 letter to Kant, she writes that a man she loved had 
fallen out of love with her when she revealed a protracted but harmless lie, which was apparently 
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connected with the fact that she had had a previously relationship.  She asks Kant for "solace, or 
for counsel to prepare [her] for death", proceeding to make it clear that she meant she was 
contemplating suicide (CO 11:273-4).  Kant writes in 1792 back encouraging her not to kill 
herself, counseling "composure", and remarking that "life, insofar as it is cherished for the good 
that we can do, deserves the highest respect and the greatest solicitude in preserving it and 
cheerfully using it for good ends" (CO 11:334).  But he refuses to provide a "moral sedative": he 
tells her that even a harmless lie is "a serious violation of duty to oneself and one for which there 
can be no remission", and lectures her about some of the details of his theory of remorse 
discussed above, sternly advising that her "bitter self-reproach" for the lie should not be Reue 
over "imprudence [Unklugheit]" but Reue "grounded in a purely moral judgment [auf bloßer 
sittlicher Beurtheilung ...Verhaltens gründet]" of her behavior (CO 11:331-3).  He goes on to 
attempt to temper his admonition with a remark part of which we have already considered: 
But to brood over one's remorse [über…Reue zu brüten] and then, when one has 
already caught on to a different set of attitudes, to make one's whole life useless 
by continuous self-reproach [Vorwürfe] on account of something that happened 
once upon a time and cannot be anymore - that would be a fantastic notion of 
deserved self-torture [verdienstlicher Selbstpeinigung] (assuming that one is sure 
of having reformed).  (CO 11:333-4) 
This remark obviously leaves open the possibility that we have a reason to think continued self-
torture is deserved if we are not sure of having reformed, or, in the terms used earlier, if we are 
not sure our conversion is complete.  Von Herbert appears to have been quite familiar with 
Kant’s work, and thus may well have been familiar with his skepticism about ever really being 
certain of our underlying motives:  
[A] human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite 
certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral intention and the 
sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no doubt about the legality of the 
action…[H]ow many people who have lived long and guiltless lives may not be 
merely fortunate in having escaped so many temptations? In the case of any deed 
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it remains hidden from the agent himself how much pure moral content there has 
been in his disposition. (MM 6:392-3, also see G 4:407) 
 
This would seem to imply that we cannot be sure our conversion is complete, and in conjunction 
with the passage from Kant’s letter cited above, that we would never be justified in ceasing to 
torture ourselves.12  It would not be surprising for such an idea to prompt excess remorse.  Von 
Herbert wrote to Kant again in 1793, expressing a "sense of constantly reproaching [vorwerfen] 
herself" (CO 11:401), and a continued desire to "shorten [her] so useless life" (CO 11:402), and 
once again in 1794, stating that while she still wished to die, she felt that "if people take morality 
and friends into account [they can] with the greatest desire to die still wish for life and try to 
preserve it no matter what" (CO 11:486).  Kant did not reply to either of these letters, and von 
Herbert committed suicide in 1803. 
Owen Ware argues that in the Religion and Metaphysics of Morals, Kant struggles 
against his skepticism about knowing our underlying motivations which I mentioned above in 
connection with Kant’s letter to Maria von Herbert.  Ware thinks that while Kant holds that we 
lack knowledge that our conversion is complete, Kant arrives at “subjectively sufficient grounds” 
for the belief that our conversion is complete, grounds which yield what Kant calls ‘conviction’” 
(Ware 2009: 694, citing A822/B580).  Ware argues that a key threat to knowledge of our 
underlying motivations is that when we evaluate ourselves, we are always inclined to see 
ourselves as better than we really are, or as Kant puts it in the Groundwork passage cited above, 
that we like to “flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive” (G 4:407).  
Ware argues that Kant circumvents this problem in his account of conscience by appointing God 
as an authoritative and distinct person within us: representing the verdict of conscience as handed 
 
12 This would in turn imply that there is in fact no justification for what I called the first stage of 
conversion pain, the punitive pain stage, to be finite in duration. 
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down by God provides the verdict with an authority that self-evaluation lacks.  Ware thinks this 
implies that if we are diligent about submitting not only our particular actions but also our 
maxims for the scrutiny of conscience, and conscience does not hand down a verdict of “guilty”, 
we can have conviction that our conversion is complete.  I think this is a plausible and interesting 
account of some of Kant’s aims in his theory of conscience.  But as discussed earlier (and as 
Ware acknowledges), we must acknowledge that what we represent as God in conscience is also 
an aspect of ourselves which we ourselves set up as authoritative, however rationally rarefied it 
may be.  As Kant puts it, “[a]lthough it certainly sounds questionable, it is in no way 
reprehensible to say that every human being makes a God for himself” (RR 6:169n).  Would it be 
so unreasonable for someone uncertain about the completion of his conversion to worry that he 
might have unwittingly incorporated a bit of self-flattery into his God, and that the verdict of his 
conscience therefore lacked authority, so that even if it did not demand continued self-
retribution, he might deserve it anyway?  This kind of objection might be seen as asking more of 
Kant’s ethics than in can reasonably provide, were it not for the serious damage to rational 
agency that threatens us if the authority of conscience is unstable in rational reflection.  It seems 
to me that it is unstable, and that its authority depends as much on a kind of faith as it does on 
reason, a faith which is least likely to be found in the people who need it most.  I lack space to 
argue for this claim in detail, but I think that we may find an example of such a person in Maria’s 
brother, Baron Franz Paul von Herbert.   
The historical evidence that Franz Paul had expertise in Kant’s philosophy is as strong as 
it is with respect to Maria.  The von Herbert family were lead paint manufacturers in Klagenfurt, 
and Franz Paul left the family business to study Kant’s philosophy in Jena and Weimar, making 
the acquaintance of a number of Kantian philosophers including Karl Leonard Reinhold. 
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According to Wilhelm Baum, Reinhold and Herbert had many conversations, and Reinhold 
wrote in a letter that Herbert was his “house and table companion” for four weeks (Baum 1996: 
489).  Upon Franz Paul’s return to Klagenfurt, he established a discussion circle to debate Kant’s 
philosophy, despite strong local political opposition (Langton 1992: 481, Baum 1996: 499-504).  
Franz Paul committed suicide in 1811, after leaving this gnomic but sadly evocative passage in 
his will in 1810: 
[M]y children, may you take the truth deeply into your hearts that an upright way 
of life is impossible without the faith in the divine judge announced by the 
conscience, without this faith the consequent man owes himself [bleibt 
sich…schuldig] for the last answer to the last question.  (Baum: 1996, 513) 
 
This passage is of course too oblique and brief to count as a critique of Kant’s idea of 
conscience, but it seems fair to say that it manifests concern about the reflective instability of 
that idea.  It would probably be unfair to suggest that Kant’s own philosophy played a role in the 
death of either of the von Herbert siblings.  People commit suicide for a variety of reasons, and 
the von Herberts’ consciences were not the only painful things in their lives.  Maria had lost her 
love, and Franz Paul’s activities were the subject not only of political opposition but also active 
police scrutiny (Baum 1996: 499-504).  Further, for all we know, the von Herberts may have had 
a genetic predisposition to major depressive disorder, and may have suffered from chronic lead 
exposure, which is also positively correlated with major depression.  But it does seem reasonable 
to think that we have textual evidence that anxieties about conscience and excess remorse may 
have played a role in both their deaths, and that neither found anything in Kant’s philosophy to 
keep them alive.  It is probably unreasonable to hope that any philosophy can prevent suicide.  
But it does not seem unreasonable to expect a philosopher who advocates heart-crushing 






The overall conclusion I draw is that while Kant has a detailed and interesting account of 
remorse which is compelling in some respects, he does not offer enough detail about how we can 
prevent remorse from damaging our rational agency for us to be confident that we ought to 
cultivate conscience in such a way as to conform to his model of remorse.  As far as my 
argument here is concerned, it may nonetheless be the case that Kant is right about how we 
should experience remorse, and that it therefore falls to Kantian ethicists to explain how we can 
experience such remorse without damage to rational agency.  But another sensible option for 
Kantian ethicists is to seek alternative models of remorse which can be developed within Kantian 
ethics, in a way that is revisionist but nonetheless grounded in important features of Kant’s 
philosophy.  One such alternative model can be grounded in the duty of sympathy (e.g. MM 
6:456-8).  The duty of sympathy gives us a reason to be pained by the pain we cause people we 
have wronged, and I think this is a reason to be pained by our wrongs which cannot be reduced 
to a consequentialist reason.  Thus a Kantian sympathy-based model is, like Kant’s own model, 
not purely consequentialist.  I think the duty of sympathy derives from the duty to take others’ 
ends as one’s own (G 4:430; MM 6:388, 450), and that it therefore has a ground in Kant’s moral 
system which is at least as fundamental as the ground of retributivism.  But an argument for this 
alternative model must be deferred for another occasion. 
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